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Robert B. Ahdieh
A central feature—if not the central feature—of legal scholarship today is 
analysis across divides.
It is perhaps surprising, then, how little has been written across the seemingly 
thin divide that separates administrative law and fi nancial regulation. To 
be sure, the cross-fertilization of administrative law and fi nancial regulation 
scholarship and practice is not without its challenges—including a number 
grounded in the self-reinforcing norms and expectations of legal academia. 
Such norms can change, however, and they should.
The benefi ts of increased engagement across the administrative law/fi nancial 
regulation divide are substantial. Consider the various other occasions for 
analysis across divides that defi ne legal scholarship today: interdisciplinary 
studies, comparative law, legal history, and even the common law method writ 
large.
Over the past fi fty years, interdisciplinary study—the analysis of questions 
across the divide between disciplines—has come to dominate legal scholarship. 
Law and economics has been described as “the most successful intellectual 
movement in the law of the past thirty years.”1 From a few scholars, at a few 
schools, writing on a few subjects, it has established its place in nearly every 
fi eld, at nearly every law school in the United States, and even overseas. But 
law and economics is far from unique in that regard.
Starting from the seminal work of Lawrence Friedman, Marc Galanter, 
Stewart Macaulay, David and Louise Trubek, and others, the study of law and 
society has enjoyed similarly wide—if distinct—infl uence. Law and psychology, 
law and politics, and law and philosophy have each secured a wide following 
as well. The “law and . . .” movement thus captures much of the history of legal 
1. STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 216 (2008).
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scholarship over the past half-century2—and arguably represents the dominant 
approach to legal scholarship today.
Long before the rise of interdisciplinary studies, comparative law scholars 
can be understood to have engaged in an analogous exercise. No less than 
scholars of law and economics or law and psychology, comparativists sought 
insight in analyzing questions across relevant divides. Their divides were 
simply ones of geography, rather than disciplines. If one hopes to understand 
the role of consideration in our common law system—as I tell my contracts 
students—one might fi nd greater insight in the absence of that doctrine in civil 
law jurisdictions than anywhere else.
The work of legal historians might be framed in a similar light. Rather than 
a geographic divide, however, the scholar of legal history seeks insight across 
divides of a temporal nature. Our understanding of modern-day admiralty 
law is thus signifi cantly enhanced by reference to the lex mercatoria and even 
Roman law.
One might even understand doctrinal legal scholarship to turn on 
analysis across divides of a sort. The essence of the common law—and of 
scholarly analysis of it—is the task of distinguishing cases. It is precisely in 
the distinctions among cases—in relevant divides—that common law reasoning 
fi nds opportunity for doctrinal evolution.
Legal scholars do not lack appreciation, then, of the utility of analysis 
across divides. The absence of such analysis in the study of administrative law 
and fi nancial regulation is thus something of a mystery. Perhaps especially 
so, given the modest nature of the relevant divide: one that is intra- rather 
than interdisciplinary, one that operates within rather than across geographic 
boundaries, and one that involves no temporal dimension but operates entirely 
within current-day law.
For all the proximity in their interests, targets of study, and even analytical 
tools, however, scholars of administrative law and of fi nancial regulation 
(including securities regulation, in particular) have shown strikingly little 
interest in one another. Analysis across this narrow divide has been all but 
nonexistent; scholars of each discipline rarely read one another, cite one 
another, or even talk to one another.
To engage this peculiar lacuna in the legal literature, this essay proceeds in 
four stages. First, I review the history of the divide, as well as recent eff orts to 
bridge it. Second, I outline core characteristics of the divide: the two fi elds’ 
distinct motivations, divergent assumptions about the market, and particular 
limitations. With a clearer picture of the nature of the divide, I suggest some 
of the insights that might be gained from engagement across it. Finally, I 
conclude by acknowledging the challenges attendant to writing across the 
administrative law/fi nancial regulation divide—while also highlighting the 
need to overcome those challenges.
2. Critical legal studies is perhaps the most important exception.
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History of the Administrative Law/Financial Regulation Divide
Notably, the divide between administrative law and fi nancial regulation 
cannot be traced to the genesis of each body of law—or to the scholarly work 
that initially emerged around them. To the contrary, during the New Deal, the 
overlap of administrative law and fi nancial regulation was substantial.
That overlap began with the centrality of the fi nancial markets—and the 
need to regulate them more eff ectively—as key drivers in the emergence of 
the administrative state. Financial regulation can thus be understood as a 
critical impetus for the elaboration of a law and jurisprudence of government 
administration. Agencies oriented to fi nancial regulation were among the fi rst 
administrative agencies, meanwhile, and among the most important ones 
established during the New Deal.3 The engagement of federal regulation with 
state law also saw some of its earliest manifestations in the realm of fi nancial 
regulation, including with reference to state Blue Sky Laws.4
The close connection between the study/practice of administrative law and 
fi nancial regulation in the early days of each fi eld might be seen even more 
vividly in the career of James Landis. A professor of legislation at Harvard Law 
School, Landis was invited to Washington at the urging of Felix Frankfurter, 
to help draft what became the Securities Act of 1933. Upon establishment 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission the following year, Landis was 
appointed a member, and subsequently as its second chairman.
Landis is equally well-known, however, as author of The Administrative Process—
drafted during his tenure as chairman of the Commission and published 
immediately after, when he stepped down to become the Dean of Harvard 
Law.5 From the date of its publication and for decades thereafter, Landis’s work 
stood as the leading defense of the rise of the administrative state. Further, it 
heavily infl uenced the design of the Administrative Procedure Act—the core 
framework of administrative law to this day.
In subsequent years, however, the disciplines drifted apart. No single 
explanation accounts for the shift, but a number of contributing factors might 
be identifi ed. Gillian Metzger, to begin, points to the changed focus of federal 
rulemaking in the 1960s and 1970s. In its origins, economic regulation—utility 
regulation, ratemaking, common carrier rules, entry controls, and the like—
represented the primary content of federal regulation. Over time, however, 
environmental and health risks, among other social concerns, emerged as 
alternative—and even dominant—areas of focus. With that shift, scholars of 
administrative law increasingly found themselves in conversation with their 
3. The Offi  ce of the Comptroller of the Currency was established in 1863, and the Federal 
Reserve System in 1913. Two of the earliest and most signifi cant New Deal administrative 
agencies, meanwhile, were the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (1933) and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (1934). 
4. See Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes 
of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 25-29 (1998).
5. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
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public law colleagues. Scholars of fi nancial regulation, by contrast, gravitated 
to the private side of the academic house, engaging their business law 
colleagues.
Another likely factor behind the growing divide was the pattern of increased 
specialization in legal scholarship generally.6 The strong emphasis on ensuring 
independence in fi nancial regulation—in some contrast with the emphasis 
of administrative law on accountability—may also have been important.7 
To related eff ect may have been the greater role of internal and political 
checks in fi nancial regulation, as manifest in its reliance on multimember 
commissions and distinct interest-group dynamics.8 Following directly from 
those diff erences, in turn, was each fi eld’s distinct approach to judicial review.9
One might also consider a more fundamental reason scholars of 
administrative law and fi nancial regulation might have gone their separate 
ways. The fi elds are, in a sense, engaged with fundamentally diff erent 
questions. Administrative law focuses on question of process, separate and 
apart from any given area of law. Financial regulation, by contrast, is one such 
substantive area of law—akin to environmental law, workplace health and 
safety law, and the like. As obvious as that contrast might seem, however, it 
cannot alone explain the sharp divide in the study of administrative law and 
fi nancial regulation. Scholars of substantive environmental law and workplace 
health and safety law thus engage regularly with scholars of administrative 
law. Not uncommonly, in fact, they are the same people.
Whatever the precise origins of the administrative law/fi nancial regulation 
divide, recent engagement across it may suggest it can be bridged. For the 
most part, such engagement has not been explicit. Rather, it emerges in the 
work of scholars conversant in both bodies of law, some of whose writing looks 
to one of the relevant literatures in attempting to engage the other.
David Zaring’s scholarship may be most notable in that regard. In work 
on the appropriate level of transparency in fi nancial regulation, for example, 
Zaring has drawn on insights fr om administrative law.10 Conversely, exploring 
the impact of globalization on administrative law, he has taken lessons from 
the experience of fi nancial regulation.11 Analogously, some of my own work—
6. See David K. Levi & Mitu Gulati, “Only Connect”: Toward a Unifi ed Measurement Project, 58 DUKE 
L.J. 1181, 1182 (2009) (noting increased specialization of legal scholarship).
7. See Gillian E. Metzger, Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Refl ection: The Evolving Relationship 
Between Administrative Law and Financial Regulation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 130 (2015).
8. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 VAND. 
L. REV. 599, 610 (2010); Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of 
Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991, 2042-49 (2014).
9. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefi t Analysis: Toward a Framework of Function(s) and 
Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1983, 2004 (2013); Metzger, supra note 7, at 133.
10. See David Zaring, Free Trade Through Regulation?, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
11. See David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the New Administrative Law, 91 WASH. U.L. REV. 59, 94 
(2013); see also David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187 (2010).
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including on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s construction of 
a National Market System and on monetary policymaking by the Federal 
Open Market Committee—has sought to engage both bodies of scholarly 
work.12 Scholarly analysis of the extension of cost-benefi t analysis to fi nancial 
regulation in recent years might also be cited in this regard.13
Of late, moreover, scholars have begun to engage the divide more explicitly. 
In Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Refl ection: The Evolving Relationship Between 
Administrative Law and Financial Regulation, Gillian Metzger highlights diff erences 
in the focus of each discipline and the institutions that characterize it, as 
well as the ways in which the global fi nancial crisis may have helped to draw 
them closer together.14 Responding to Metzger’s analysis, Tom Merrill has 
questioned the viability of meaningful analysis across the administrative law/
fi nancial regulation divide, let alone closer alignment in relevant regulatory 
practices—given what he describes as the “quicksilver” problem in fi nancial 
regulation.15 Jacob Gerson, fi nally, cites the fi nancial crisis as the source of 
signifi cant shifts in our framework of administrative law—to embrace a role for 
so-called “superagencies,” to encourage what he terms a “web of jurisdiction” 
approach to agency authority, and to increase reliance on statutory deadlines 
to shape agency action.16
The scope of this recent engagement should not be overestimated, however. 
By way of a bit of loose empiricism, I conducted a quick search of Westlaw’s 
database of journals and law reviews (JLR) for articles with “securities 
regulation,” “securities law,” or “fi nancial regulation” in the title, and found 
1133 pieces.17 Among those, only sixty-fi ve included any textual reference to the 
basic administrative law terminology of “notice and comment” or “arbitrary 
and capricious.” Whatever might have been read into that small number a 
decade ago, one might have expected to fi nd more today—some fi ve years after 
a seminal ruling of the D.C. Circuit on the arbitrary and capricious nature of 
a highly visible Dodd-Frank Act rulemaking by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.18
12. See Robert B. Ahdieh, From Fedspeak to Forward Guidance: Regulatory Dimensions of Central Bank 
Communications, 50 GA. L. REV. 213 (2015); Robert B. Ahdieh, Law’s Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law 
in Market Transition, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 215 (2004).
13. See Ahdieh, supra note 9; John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefi t Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case 
Studies and Implications, 124 YALE. L.J. 882 (2015); Jeff rey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefi t-
Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S351 (2014).
14. Metzger, supra note 7.
15. Thomas W. Merrill, A Comment on Metzger and Zaring: The Quicksilver Problem, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 189 (2015).
16. Jacob E. Gersen, Administrative Law Goes to Wall Street: The New Administrative Process, 65 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 689 (2013).
17. Search by author in Westlaw’s JLR database (June 28, 2016).
18. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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Nature of the Administrative Law/Financial Regulation Divide
Whatever the historical origins and future of the administrative law/
fi nancial regulation divide, it is useful to understand its key characteristics 
today. Consider three critical points of diff erentiation: First, what motivates 
each fi eld of law—and the scholarly analysis thereof? Second, what are the 
assumptions about the market against which each fi eld operates? Finally, what 
constraints does the regulatory project face in each fi eld? However much our 
answers might change over time, signifi cant diff erences might be identifi ed 
today, across each of these areas.
Motivations/Goals
Central to the project of administrative law are the intertwined goals of 
transparency and accountability. With the delegation of signifi cant regulatory, 
adjudicatory, and enforcement authority to unelected agency offi  cials, the 
Administrative Procedure Act, the jurisprudence that has emerged around 
it, and the associated scholarly literature have sought to defi ne appropriate 
limitations on agency power.19 In particular, Congress, the judiciary, and the 
academy have called for signifi cant transparency in agencies’ procedures and 
sought to hold them accountable for their actions through both judicial and 
political review—the former imposed explicitly and the latter encouraged and 
facilitated, including by way of enhanced transparency.20
In fi nancial regulation as well, one might fi nd some emphasis on transparency 
and accountability. Some meaningful interest in fealty to statutory text—or at 
least to those texts that off er some meaningful degree of precision—might be 
seen to refl ect those goals. One might also see them refl ected more directly, 
including in the broad orientation of fi nancial regulation to disclosure,21 in 
increasingly robust rulemaking processes,22 and in the accountability generated 
by the collaborative nature of Securities and Exchange Commission decision-
making, especially given its politically diverse membership.23
Any orientation to transparency and accountability in fi nancial regulation 
should not be overstated, however. One might identify some desire—and even 
need—to limit transparency and accountability in fi nancial regulation. As I 
will suggest below, a high level of transparency might confl ict with eff ective 
regulation of the fi nancial markets, as in the problematic consequences of giving 
19. See PETER H. SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 53 (1994) (suggesting due 
process functions of the Administrative Procedure Act).
20. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, The Next Generation of Administrative Law: Building the Legal Infrastructure 
for Collaborative Governance, 2010 WISC. L. REV. 297, 342.
21. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities 
Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 418 (2003).
22. See, e.g., Letter from Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Scott Garrett, 
Representative, U.S. House of Representatives 2 (Aug. 5, 2011).
23. See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 8, at 610.
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market participants notice of potential agency action.24 As for accountability, 
meanwhile, relevant interest groups’ focus on particular fi nancial regulators 
can be expected to be quite intense, given the fi nancial consequences of 
their alternative regulatory choices. Heightened political accountability, as a 
consequence, has the potential to serve as a path to increased, rather than 
decreased, interest group infl uence.
The primary focus of fi nancial regulation, instead, is on two other goals—
and on achieving an appropriate equilibrium between them: namely, the 
protection of shareholders and investors more generally, and the raising of 
capital via effi  cient markets. As the Securities and Exchange Commission 
summarizes its mission, it seeks “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, 
and effi  cient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”25
One can see echoes of transparency and accountability in that mandate, 
of course. As suggested above, however, the goals of investor protection and 
market effi  ciency may—perhaps as often as not—best be secured by reduced 
transparency, and even diminished accountability. Even where transparency or 
accountability is the goal, meanwhile, fi nancial regulation might well pursue 
that goal in ways distinct from those demanded by administrative law.
Distinct Assumptions About the Market
Distinct assumptions about the market also contribute to the divide 
between the study/practice of administrative law and fi nancial regulation.26 In 
administrative law, the market represents the structure to be policed by way of 
eff ective regulation. Much of the work of administrative agencies can thus be 
understood as responses to perceived market failures.
Financial regulation, by contrast, engages the market as something to be 
facilitated—even encouraged. Of course, regulation must ensure effi  ciency of 
the market. That caveat aside, however, a role for regulation in facilitating 
markets diff ers markedly from the project of correcting market ineffi  ciencies.
This distinctive attitude of each fi eld toward the market should not be 
exaggerated, of course. Financial regulation places signifi cant limitations 
on markets as well, from disclosure requirements and anti-fraud regulation 
to capitalization requirements and licensure rules. Certain other fi elds, 
meanwhile, also embrace a role for agencies in market facilitation. Aspects 
of telecommunications regulation—and government standard-setting 
generally—can be understood in that light. Certain aspects of natural resource 
management and energy policy are to similar eff ect. Nowhere is the task of 
market facilitation and encouragement as direct, however, as in fi nancial 
regulation.
24. See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
25. What We Do, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.
shtml.
26. See Metzger, supra note 8, at 142-44.
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Constraints on Regulatory Process and Design
The divide between the study/practice of administrative law and fi nancial 
regulation also turns on distinct constraints on the eff ective application of 
each body of law. A number of such limitations might be highlighted, but let 
me emphasize just two—time and space—that can be expected to impact each 
fi eld in signifi cantly diff erent ways.
Consider time: In questioning the viability of any convergence—or even 
meaningful engagement—of administrative law and fi nancial regulation, Tom 
Merrill calls attention to the capacity for quick exit in the fi nancial markets.27 In 
many—if not most—of the areas in which administrative law has been applied, 
the entities and assets subject to regulation are not capable of rapid relocation. 
Railroads, for example, are literally nailed to the ground.
By contrast, money is highly mobile—and even fungible. That is in its very 
nature. It is even more true today, however, as a result of fast-moving—even 
instantaneous—trading technologies. Increasingly globalized capital markets 
further ease exit, as do sophisticated fi nancial instruments, including ever-
changing synthetic products not susceptible to sustained regulation.
Given as much, Merrill suggests the deliberative and intentionally slow-
moving processes at the heart of administrative law are likely to have little to 
off er in fi nancial regulation. Between the rapidity of capital movement and 
the pace of innovation, the market can be expected to get ahead of almost 
any potential regulatory intervention—let alone one that emerges with the 
methodical pace required by administrative law.
Consider, for example, the placement of banks and other systemically 
important fi nancial institutions into receivership.28 In the case of banks, 
relevant federal agencies have long been permitted to proceed expeditiously 
and in secret to avoid both the classic “run on the bank” and potential asset-
stripping moves by incumbent managers. In extending those agency powers 
from banks to a broader range of fi nancial institutions, the Dodd-Frank Act 
insisted on judicial review of agencies’ receivership decisions. But consider 
the legislation’s limitations on that review, in the name of expedition and 
confi dentiality: The judicial process is itself to be secret, with signifi cant 
criminal sanctions for those who disclose even the fact of such review. The 
judge must rule within twenty-four hours, is permitted to evaluate only two 
of the seven factors that the agency weighed in its decision, and must do so 
under a relatively permissive “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review. 
After the court’s decision, meanwhile, no stays are permitted pending appeal, 
and no injunctive relief is available against the receiver. The discrepancy 
between this process and administrative law’s expectations of transparency 
and accountability, of course, could not be more stark.
Beyond such constraints of time—the relative need for expedition in fi nancial 
regulation, as compared with administrative law—certain constraints of space 
27. See Merrill, supra note 9.
28. See id. at 197-99. 
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might also be understood to distinguish fi nancial regulation and administrative 
law. For much federal regulation—and hence for administrative law—an entirely 
domestic reach is likely to be suffi  cient. Vehicle safety regulation, workplace 
health and safety rules, and even a great deal of environmental protection play 
themselves out almost entirely at the national (or even subnational) level.
It is almost impossible, by contrast, to approach fi nancial regulation from 
a purely domestic perspective. Whatever select questions might be engaged 
in that fashion, they represent the exception rather than the rule in fi nancial 
regulation. From audit committee composition requirements to questions 
of extraterritorial enforcement, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
must attend to both static and dynamic reactions to its regulatory initiatives 
overseas. One might even see the progressive advance of fi nancial market 
regulation from state-level to federal-level regulation, and the ensuing (and 
still developing) role of federal regulators in shaping transnational regulatory 
processes—including the much-discussed rise of transnational regulatory 
networks29—as indicative of the progressively expanding geographic reach of 
fi nancial regulation.
That said, distinctions of space in administrative law and fi nancial 
regulation may be diminishing. To a growing degree, regulators outside the 
fi nancial arena face the need to consider the transnational dynamics associated 
with their regulatory choices. Climate change and internet regulation are only 
the most obvious examples.
Learning Across the Divide
There exists, then, a real—if perhaps shifting—divide in the study/practice 
of administrative law and fi nancial regulation. Might it be useful to bridge 
that divide? What might we learn from scholarly engagement across it?
Before suggesting a handful of particular opportunities for learning across 
the administrative law/fi nancial regulation divide, it may be useful to return 
to where we started. How should we understand the benefi ts of other analyses 
across divides—interdisciplinary scholarship, comparative legal analysis, 
legal history, and engagement across distinct legal disciplines, from torts and 
criminal law to antitrust and consumer protection?
In each analysis, we gain something from studying the distinct motivations, 
assumptions, and modes of thinking of the “other.” Economic analysis may 
help us better evaluate the effi  cacy of damages versus specifi c performance as 
a remedy in contract law.30 German civil procedure may suggest the limitations 
of an adversarial approach to expert testimony.31 An awareness of the origins 
29. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Coordination and Confl ict: The Persistent Relevance of Networks in International 
Financial Regulation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (2015); Stavros Gadinis, Three Pathways to 
Global Standards: Private, Regulator, and Ministry Networks, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2015).
30. See Steven Shavell, Specifi c Performance Versus Damages for Breach of Contract: An Economic Analysis, 84 
TEX. L. REV. 831 (2006).
31. See John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985).
73Notes from the Border
of the hearsay rule may clarify its appropriate application today.32 And our 
understanding of culpability in criminal law may be enriched by studying the 
principles of liability in tort law.33
Something similar might be expected across the gap that divides the study 
of administrative law and fi nancial regulation. Consider, once again, questions 
of secrecy and confi dentiality. As described above, fi nancial regulators must 
necessarily proceed with secrecy in placing a bank or other systemically 
important fi nancial institution into receivership. The same is true of their 
routine interest-rate setting decisions, as well as their response to nonroutine 
incidents of fi nancial panic. Even fairly mundane regulatory and adjudicatory 
tasks may require confi dentiality where proprietary business data must be 
evaluated.
Such pressures are less likely to be present—at least ordinarily—in 
administrative law. On the other hand, administrative law has had the benefi t 
of decades of experience navigating the trade-off  between transparency and 
effi  ciency. In fostering the effi  cacy of agencies’ regulatory undertakings, 
thus, administrative law scholars have been forced to grapple with just the 
question faced by students of fi nancial regulation: the appropriate limits of 
transparency.34 Scholars of fi nancial regulation would do well, as such, to 
engage the principles of transparency developed in administrative law.
Financial regulation scholars might also learn something from administrative 
law, practice, and scholarship as they seek to promote increased regularity 
in relevant decision-making procedures. Elements of the administrative law 
framework of external accountability may thus off er insight into procedures for 
the generation of internally oriented guidance and interpretations—which play 
a relatively more central role in fi nancial regulation, for the reasons of secrecy 
outlined above.
In precisely that spirit, I have explored the ways in which the Federal Open 
Market Committee embraced something more of a “rulemaking” approach 
as it sought to respond to the Great Financial Crisis.35 In seeking to bend 
the curve of long-term interest rates, with short-term rate targets already at 
zero, the Committee increasingly relied on communication as a tool of monetary 
policy. In doing so, however, it needed to introduce signifi cantly enhanced 
32. See John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437 (1904).
33. See David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV. 
59 (1996). An analogous case for integrating administrative law and immigration law has been 
off ered by Chris Walker. See Chris Walker, The Costs of Immigration Exceptionalism, http://www.
yalejreg.com/blog/the-costs-of-immigration-exceptionalism-by-chris-walker. 
34. See Daniel E. Andersen, Straddling the Federal-State Divide: Federal Court Review of Interstate Agency 
Actions, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1610 (2016) (“Effi  ciency often comes at the expense of 
accountability and vice versa.”); see also Sidney A. Shapiro, The Top Ten Reasons that Law Students 
Dislike Administrative Law and What Can (Or Should) Be Done About Them?, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 351, 359-
60 (2000).
35. See Ahdieh, Fedspeak, supra note 6.
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dimensions of notice and reason-giving into its decision-making procedures—
echoing precisely the demands of notice-and-comment rulemaking.
No less opportunity exists for administrative law scholars to learn from 
fi nancial regulation. A succession of D.C. Circuit decisions over the last 
decade, for example, imposed signifi cant cost-benefi t analysis requirements on 
the Securities and Exchange Commission. In particular, the Business Roundtable 
decision of 2011 held the Commission’s economic analysis of its proposed 
proxy access rule to be arbitrary and capricious—a signifi cant departure from 
past judicial practice with regard to fi nancial regulation.36
For precisely that reason, the decision provides an important opportunity 
for learning in administrative law. In exploring the extension of cost-benefi t 
analysis into a new and complex area, administrative law scholars have 
the opportunity to gain new insight into its nature.37 This begins with the 
possibility of a broader range of potential forms of cost-benefi t analysis than 
have commonly been acknowledged. It also raises questions of function, 
including the need to move away from a singular emphasis on effi  ciency as the 
operative goal of cost-benefi t analysis. No less, the study of cost-benefi t analysis 
in fi nancial regulation raises important questions about the appropriate scope 
of judicial review of such analysis. Ultimately, by exploring the application of 
cost-benefi t analysis in fi nancial regulation, administrative law scholars may 
come to embrace a more ecumenical conception of the nature of—and the 
appropriate approach to—cost-benefi t analysis.38
Challenges of Crossing the Divide
However much scholars of administrative law and fi nancial regulation 
might stand to learn from one another, signifi cant challenges face those who 
seek to bridge the divide. Three issues are particularly salient: audience, 
authority, and advancement. While not insurmountable, each of these barriers 
is substantial.
As things stand today, scholars of administrative law and fi nancial 
regulation write in diff erent journals, attend diff erent conferences, and sit on 
diff erent panels, even when they attend conferences directed to both. When 
given the opportunity to sponsor joint programs on topics of mutual interest—
as at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools—they do 
so less often than one might hope. Scholarship in each fi eld, as such, speaks to 
entirely diff erent audiences. And eff orts to write across the fi elds face resulting 
diffi  culties of appropriate starting points, framing, and language.
The challenges of audience in administrative law and fi nancial regulation are 
likely aggravated by broader trends in audience selection in legal scholarship. 
36. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
37. See Ahdieh, Reanalyzing, supra note 7.
38. It is telling, however, that the bulk of the writing on cost-benefi t analysis in fi nancial 
regulation has been penned by scholars of fi nancial regulation rather than by administrative 
law scholars.
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The narrowcasting of scholarly writing in law is a pattern many decades in the 
making. That trend has likely accelerated in recent years, with the growth in 
online distribution—often directed to one, relatively narrow audience.
The (eminently reasonable) drive to reduce the length of law review articles 
might also contribute to challenges of audience in bridging the gap between 
administrative law and fi nancial regulation. Given a need to limit the length of 
one’s submitted work, the natural place to trim is in background and context. 
Yet those are precisely the elements that make scholarly work accessible to 
those outside the author’s fi eld—perhaps especially for those writing in a more 
technical fi eld, such as fi nancial regulation.
Questions of audience lead directly to questions of authority. Administrative 
law and fi nancial regulation scholars, perhaps unsurprisingly, cite very diff erent 
sources. Consider, by way of example, the Supreme Court’s pair of decisions 
in SEC v. Chenery—both staples of the administrative law canon.39 For all their 
importance in administrative law, the cases are of little relevance in fi nancial 
regulation. They are rarely cited, and most assuredly are not central to the 
jurisprudence of securities law, notwithstanding their genesis in that fi eld.
The same might be said of the case law generally—as well as relevant treatises 
and the secondary literature cited by scholars in each fi eld. Loss & Seligman’s 
seminal treatise on securities law is unlikely to be cited by administrative law 
scholars—even in analyzing a securities law case.40 Nor would the Administrative 
Law Treatise, fi rst prepared by Kenneth Culp Davis more than a half-century 
ago and now authored by Richard Pierce, likely be cited by those writing on 
fi nancial regulation.41 No law review article on administrative law, meanwhile, 
is likely to be chosen for inclusion on one of the various annual lists of “top 
ten” works in corporate and securities law. And vice versa.
One might also see something of the challenge of divergent authority in the 
quasi-constitutional status of the Administrative Procedure Act in the study of 
administrative law. The Act enjoys no similar stature in scholarship on fi nancial 
regulation. Rather, the substantive legislation that undergirds the latter—the 
Securities Act, the Securities Exchange Act, the Investment Company Act, 
and the Investment Advisers Act, among other major statutes—enjoy pride 
of place. These are not inherently exclusive sources, of course. In practice, 
however, things tend to work out that way—with attendant implications for the 
ease of writing across the two fi elds.
Finally—and not unrelated to the challenges of audience and authority—
writing across the administrative law/fi nancial regulation divide also raises 
signifi cant questions of professional advancement. The diffi  culties begin with 
one’s home institution.
39. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
40. LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION (5th ed. 2014).
41. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (4th ed. 2002).
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In setting one’s teaching priorities, in the selection of scholarly mentors, 
in the distribution of drafts, and the like, focus is invaluable. At a minimum, 
this arises from scarcity of time. But it also responds to something more 
fundamental: what might be understood as lawyers’ natural tendency toward 
classifi cation. For reasons of both simplifi cation and measurement/evaluation, 
thus, we are apt to defi ne our colleagues as working in one given fi eld versus 
another.
A similar dynamic plays itself out beyond one’s home institution. In 
receiving invitations to speak at relevant symposia (and even general 
workshops, depending on how speakers are chosen), in securing mentors, 
and otherwise, having a singular fi eld of expertise can be valuable. With such 
focus, one might expect to achieve greater recognition and renown—at least 
within a given fi eld.
Of course, such external concerns come to a head in the context of tenure 
and promotion reviews. From the ability of any given reviewer to engage 
the full scope of one’s work to the prospect of a reviewer having some prior 
familiarity with it, a risk-averse strategy would likely favor writing in one 
fi eld—both in terms of the scope of any given piece of writing, and in terms of 
one’s overall work.
Broadly, the challenges of advancement in writing across fi elds of law come 
down to the question of who one is as a scholar. Consider, thus, the diffi  culty we 
would have in characterizing someone who wrote in two entirely disconnected 
fi elds—perhaps environmental law and antitrust law. The diffi  culty should be 
less daunting in administrative law and fi nancial regulation, of course. Given 
the reality of that divide as it stands today, however, an author writing across 
the fi elds might likely still seem like neither fi sh nor (scholarly) fowl.
Of course, the challenges of advancement are not insurmountable ones. My 
own approach, thus, has been to engage the questions I found interesting, and 
let things to play out as they might. I recognize, however, that I may have had 
the luxury of doing so in ways that others might not. More telling, though, 
may be my usual counsel to young scholars with interests in multiple fi elds: 
Do as I say, not as I did.
The norms and expectations that undergird that advice, however, are not 
fi xed. Neither are currently prevailing practices in promotion and tenure. Even 
audiences may be more malleable than we assume. Consider where we started: 
the interdisciplinary engagements of the “law and . . .” movement. Hard as it 
may be for us to imagine today, little or no audience existed for economic—
or political science, psychological, or literary—analysis in law schools a 
half-century ago. Might an audience for scholarship at the intersection of 
administrative law and fi nancial regulation simply be just around the corner?
Conclusion
As the impact and infl uence of interdisciplinary scholarship, comparative 
legal studies, legal history, scholarly work across other distinct legal fi elds, and 
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perhaps even the common law method make clear, legal analysis across divides 
has the potential to off er us signifi cant insight. Across methods and even 
fi elds, there is much to be gained from the eff ort. Whatever the challenges, 
thus, scholars of administrative law and fi nancial regulation do well to engage 
one another more actively. As the early shoots of such engagement begin to 
emerge, we would be wise to nurture and encourage them.
